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ARTICLES
THE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO DECLINE MEDICAL
TREATMENT: THE NEW YORK VIEW
The Honorable Sol Wachtler*
This article, which I am pleased to dedicate to my friend, Professor Josephine Y. King, deals with the evolving caselaw in the State
of New York concerning a patient's right to decline medical treatment. New York, like many other states, has been struggling with
cases involving this troublesome area of the law. The New York
State Court of Appeals consistently expressed the belief that these
cases are best resolved by the Legislature and that the court's role
should be limited to deciding only the cases which come before it.
As a result of the court's persistence in this regard, the New York
State Legislature has recently enacted certain statutes which have
gone far toward resolving the myriad of problems presented by
these cases. It has enacted laws which allow a patient to provide
that he or she is not to be resuscitated and has allowed an individual to execute a form of proxy which permits a surrogate to make
these decisions in the event the patient is incompetent to do so.
One of the strengths of the common law process is its ability to adjust to
changes in our way of life. A tradition that began in the darkest recesses of
the middle ages has been able to keep pace with changes brought about by
the printing press, the steam engine, electricity, and the many technological
advances in transportation, communication, and medical science. But the
radical advances in life sustaining equipment and procedures developed by
the medical profession in the last twenty years have taxed the common law
process in ways that it has never been tested before.
Many feel this is a self-imposed burden. In their view, the courts are intruding into an area which should be reserved for the patients, their families,
and medical professionals. But this is not a role which the judiciary has
assumed for itself. It has been thrust upon the courts by advances in medical
treatment which can extend life, or at least keep the major organs functioning, well beyond medical and legal precedent. For centuries we could say
*
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with confidence, both medically and legally, that death occurs when heart
and lungs cease to function. Now that medical science can artificially maintain respiration and heartbeat for extended periods, we are no longer so sure.
Illnesses and injuries that a few short years ago led inexorably to death now
may be cured or treated and contained but at a cost which many patients
find exorbitant financially, physically, and psychologically. Others reject the
treatments because they find them offensive to their religious or personal
sensibilities. If the patient declines medical treatment necessary to sustain
life, is it suicide? If the doctor honors the patient's wishes, is the doctor
implicated in the suicide? If the patient is incompetent but the family members and doctors agree that continued treatment would be futile, are they all
guilty of manslaughter? If the patient has left a living will or appointed a
surrogate to decline the treatment, would this provide a defense? And if the
doctor does not honor the patient's wishes, has he or she violated the patient's common law or constitutional rights? Is there a right to die?
Until a few years ago there were no clear answers to these questions under
existing law. As a result, doctors, patients, and family members facing such
choices frequently came to court to determine in advance whether a decision
to administer, withhold, or discontinue a particular medical treatment may
subject them to civil or criminal liability.
The first cases to reach the courts came like a surprise attack for which we
had no contingency plan. Our precedents drawn from the venerable traditions of the common law, where a life or death decision usually meant a
criminal execution, did not anticipate and could not anticipate the legal consequences of discontinuing a respirator for a person in a persistent vegetative
state. Of course, the Legislature has powers of foresight which are denied to
the courts, because the Legislature alone has the power to identify potential
problems and provide solutions before they arise. However, in this state,
and most others, there were few statutes specifically tailored or even generally helpful in resolving the many legal problems posed by the new technology. Although it was often asserted that constitutional rights were involved,
sometimes described as the individual's right of privacy, usually pitted
against the state's interest in preserving life, the Supreme Court remained
silent for many years while the state courts struggled with the problems and
developed an independent body of law.
The decisions from the state courts are diverse and often controversial.
Now, in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health,' the Supreme
Court has spoken and it appears that the diversity will continue.
In Cruzan, the parents of a young woman who was in a persistent vegeta1. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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tive state following an automobile accident sought to discontinue the use of a
nasogastric tube that provided food and water after she lost the ability to eat.
The state, which was paying for the hospitalization, objected and the case
went to the Missouri courts. The lower court held that the tube could be
removed because that seemed to be what the patient would want based upon
a casual conversation she had with a roommate several years earlier. The
Missouri Supreme Court reversed, concluding that clear and convincing evidence was required and that the conversation with the roommate did not
meet the standard. That decision was challenged in the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that it violated the patient's constitutional
rights, but the Court affirmed the decision. The Court noted that a person's
decision to decline medical treatment would seem to implicate the due process liberty interest which required a balancing of the individual's rights
against the interests of the State. Noting that the State had an interest in
preserving life and that the patient was incapable of expressing her present
wishes, the Court held that the State could require clear and convincing
proof that the patient would want to forego treatment under these circumstances before permitting a surrogate to act for her.
In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court observed that other states
take a more lenient view toward permitting the withdrawal of life support
systems. But the Court implicitly disclaimed any need for uniformity. Instead it noted: "State courts have available to them for decision a number of
sources-state constitutions, statutes, and common law-which are not
available to us. In this Court, the question is simply and starkly whether the
United States Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of decision which it did." 2 The actual holding may be more narrow but the
message is clear. This is an area in which the Court intends to defer to the
states. In other words: Don't call us, we'll call you.
Deference in a time of crisis is not always welcome. But the Supreme
Court's decision recognizes that the groundwork has begun and that many
states have already devised rules on basic points reflecting the needs of their
own citizens. Indeed, New York was cited as a state which has developed a
distinctive point of view. That view was not so distinct in 1981, when the
New York Court of Appeals first encountered these problems in two cases
entitled Eichner v. Dillon 3 and In re Storar.4
Eichner involved an 83-year-old member of the Society of Mary, named
Brother Fox, who was maintained on a respirator in a permanent vegetative
2. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
3. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 370, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (1981).
4. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 373, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (1981).
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state. The local director of the Society applied, as Brother Fox's court-appointed guardian, to have the respirator removed on the ground that it was
against the patient's wishes as expressed prior to his becoming incompetent.
The district attorney argued against the termination of treatment, urging
that the patient's right in this regard is outweighed by important State interests when the treatment is necessary to preserve the patient's life.
In Storar, a state hospital official applied for permission to administer
blood transfusions to a profoundly retarded 52-year-old man with terminal
cancer of the bladder. The patient's mother refused to consent on the
ground that the transfusions would only prolong his discomfort and would
be against his wishes if he were competent.
At the core of these cases was a tension between individual choice and the
interest of the State in preserving life and deterring those who would take
life. Despite the modern trimmings it is an age-old controversy which the
common law resolved in favor of personal choice, at least where the patient
was competent. As Judge Cardozo of our court stated: "Every person of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what should be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without the
patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages." 5
That principle had been adopted in tort cases where the doctor was held
liable in damages for acting without the patient's consent, but we held it was
equally available when the doctor had honored the patient's wishes to decline treatment necessary to sustain the patient's life. We noted: "A state
which imposes civil liability on a doctor if he violates the patient's right
cannot also hold him criminally responsible if he respects that right."6
But what if the patient has become incompetent? Must he be sustained in
a vegetative state even when he has previously said, while competent, that he
would not want this kind of treatment, as was the case with Brother Fox? In
Eichner v. Dillon, our court held that the patient's prior wishes can be
honored, if they can be established by clear and convincing evidence.
But what of the retarded adult, like John Storar, who has always had an
infant's mentality? Can anyone realistically determine whether he would
want to discontinue blood transfusions while suffering from terminal cancer?
In the Storar case, our court held that under those circumstances the patient
must be legally viewed as a child who cannot be denied ordinary life sustaining treatments even when a well-intentioned parent feels that is in his
best interests.
5. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
6. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
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Our next case also involved the rights of parents to make medical care
decisions for their children, but in a completely different setting. In that
case, known as the Baby Jane Doe case,7 the parents and doctor agreed that
an infant with multiple disabilities should not receive a brain and spine operation that may prolong her life, but would not cure the disabilities and might
well aggravate them. The question was whether a complete stranger could
compel them to perform the operation. Our court held that the stranger had
no standing to intrude into the family counsels, or seek the aid of the courts
to do so. We noted that the Legislature had given certain agencies the authority to determine whether parents were neglecting a child's medical needs
and that the responsible agencies in this case had determined that judicial
scrutiny was not required.
In all of these cases the patient was unquestionably alive, although suffering from some brain damage. But what if the patient has suffered a complete
cessation of all brain function, a condition known in the medical profession
as "brain death"? Is the patient legally dead at that point even if the resuscitators are able to artificially keep the heart and lungs functioning? That
question was presented to us in People v. Eulo,8 a criminal case where the
defendants were charged with murder and claimed that the doctors "did it"
when they shut off the ,machines. The defendants were found guilty, and we
affirmed the convictions, finding the "brain death" standard an acceptable
and necessary method for determining death because a dead body attached
to a machine may exhibit demonstrably false indicia of life.
The patients in the next case to reach our court were not suffering from
any physical illness and were fully capable of making their own medical decisions, or so they claimed. The problem was that they had been committed
to a state mental institution where they were receiving drug treatments to
which they objected, but which they had no right to refuse under the existing
regulations. We noted in Rivers v. Katz 9 that mental illness does not necessarily rob a person of the ability to make any rational choices, and held that
they were entitled to procedural safeguards and the right to decline the treatments if they had sufficient capacity to do so. This was also the first case in
which we had to decide whether the patient's right to decline treatment was
guaranteed by the Constitution, because if it was not, the regulations the
State had adopted would bar its exercise. We held that the right was protected under the due process clause of the State Constitution, but hastened to
add that recognizing its constitutional status did not make the right abso7. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63

(1983).
8. 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
9. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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lute, and that it could be outweighed by the State's need in an emergency to
medicate a patient who posed an immediate danger to himself or others.
The New York view, as is evident from these cases, places great emphasis
on permitting the patient to determine the course of his or her own treatment even when the patient is suffering from some mental deficiencies or has
subsequently become completely incompetent. But what is to be done when
the patient's wishes are not entirely clear? That was the situation confronting the Court of Appeals in a case entitled In re O'Connor.'0
Mary O'Connor was a 78-year-old woman who had suffered several
strokes and, as a result, became mentally incompetent and suffered certain
physical disabilities making it impossible to care for herself. The last stroke
had also deprived her of her gag reflex so that she was unable to eat or drink
without medical assistance. The doctors at the hospital wanted to insert a
nasogastric tube to keep her from dying of thirst and starvation. Her daughters opposed the application, claiming that it would be against the patient's
wishes.
There was no doubt that Mrs. O'Connor had made various statements
over the years to the effect that she never wanted to become a burden on
anyone and would not want to be kept alive by artificial means if she were
unable to take care of herself. The statements were made during the terminal illnesses of a close relative or friend. But Mrs. O'Connor was not suffering from a terminal illness, except in the sense that she was aged and infirm.
And although incompetent, she was alert and conscious, able to respond to
simple commands and not experiencing any pain. What would she want
done under these circumstances?
We granted the hospital's application, concluding that there was not clear
and convincing evidence that she would want to decline treatment when she
was not terminally ill. We noted that many aged persons suffered similar
disabilities and before becoming incompetent often stated a general desire
not to become a burden. If such statements were treated as clear and convincing proof of a desire to decline medical treatment once the person lost
the ability to care for himself or herself, few nursing home patients would
ever receive medical care.
In O'Connor, we emphasized that as a matter of New York law the inquiry in such cases is limited to ascertaining and then effectuating the patient's expressed wishes. We rejected the "substituted judgment" standard
adopted by some other courts because it is inconsistent with our fundamen10. In re Westchester County Medical Center ex rel. Mary O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531
N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
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tal commitment to the notion that no person or court should substitute its
judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another.
Our most recent case, Fosmire v. Nicoleau," should have been the first
case to reach our court because it raised the fundamental question underlying all of our prior decisions. Can a competent adult facing death decline
medical treatment for a treatable condition?
Mary Nicoleau lost a massive amount of blood after giving birth by Caesarean section. But on religious and personal grounds she refused to consent
to a blood transfusion which in her doctor's opinion was essential for her
survival. There was no question that she was competent. In fact, both she
and her husband were nurses fully aware of the risks. Nor was-there any
question that she had made a conscious choice to decline the treatment. She
had informed the hospital in advance at the time of admission that she
would not consent to a transfusion and persisted in her decision after the
transfusion became necessary.
The hospital applied for a court order authorizing the transfusion. In support of the application the hospital argued that the State had an interest in
preserving her life because she was a young woman who was in good health
except for the loss of blood, which would be completely cured with a transfusion. The hospital urged that the right to decline essential medical care
should be limited to persons suffering from terminal illnesses in which case
the State would have little or no interest in preserving life. We rejected this
argument, noting that in our prior decisions the condition of the patient had
only been relevant because the patient was incompetent but had left instructions to decline life sustaining treatments under certain circumstances.
Thus, in those cases it was necessary to assess the patient's present medical
condition to determine whether it was the type of condition in which the
patient wanted those instructions to go into effect. In this case we did not
have to make any such inquiry because the patient was able to state her
present wishes, nor was her condition relevant to the exercise of her right to
decline treatment. We stated: "The right of a patient to decline life-sustaining treatment was recognized in these cases, not because the State considered their lives worthless, but because the State valued the right of the
individual to decide what type of treatment he or she should receive under
particular circumstances." 12
The hospital's primary argument in Fosmire was that the State had an
interest in preserving the patient's life because she was now the mother of a
young child which she was not free to abandon. This is an argument that
11. 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990).
12. Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 229, 551 N.E.2d at 82-83, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82.
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had been accepted by some other courts, but we found no support for it
under existing New York law. The right of patient autonomy had been well
settled in this state, by the courts and the Legislature, and had never been
subject to such a qualification. We also observed that the various statutory
and court imposed obligations on parents did not go so far as to require
them to avoid all choices which involved an element of risk to the parent.
Litigation in these cases has served to expose the problems and deficiencies of existing law. We know now that it is not a single problem with a
single solution but a number of problems with a number of solutions, some
of which are still debatable. We also know that the courts are unsuited and
ill-equipped to serve as the sole forum, or even the primary one, for the
resolution of the many problems generated by advances in medical technology. It is an area in which the Legislature can and must play an important
role.
Because courts can only decide the actual cases brought before them, they
cannot provide answers for all, most, or even the more common problems.
Oddly, many people who originally criticized the courts for making what
they considered an unwarranted intrusion into the sickroom, now criticize
the courts for not going far enough to settle the law, or predict the outcome,
in cases that have not yet reached the courts. Obviously what is needed is a
broad body of law which can provide clear guidelines for the public and
medical professionals, not only in the cases that have arisen, but in those
which are likely to arise in the future. Only the Legislature has the authority
and capacity to initiate such rules.

